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Introduction 
 
 
The Other Vanguard of 
International Terrorism 
Despite Setbacks Al-Qaeda Profits from Yemen Civil War 
Guido Steinberg 
Yemen has been in the grip of open civil war since spring 2015. The biggest beneficiary 
of the conflict is the Yemeni al-Qaeda, whose recent capture of territory in southern 
Yemen opens up new opportunities. Its current gains will hinder a future stabilisation 
of Yemen and exacerbate the terrorist threat to Saudi Arabia. It also presents new 
dangers to the West, given that the Yemeni al-Qaeda is by far the strongest group in 
the network, and has already made repeated attempts to bring down transatlantic air-
liners. The danger it presents was underlined by the attack it instigated on the satirical 
magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris in January 2015. Although al-Qaeda in Yemen has lost 
important leaders since then, and a number of its fighters and commanders have de-
fected to the Islamic State (IS), the collapse of the Yemeni state increases the risk that it 
will exploit its expanded radius of action and prepare new attacks on the United States 
and Europe. 
 
The Yemeni civil war pits the international-
ly recognised government of President Abd 
Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, supported by Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other 
allies, against Houthi rebels and forces loyal 
to ex-President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Although 
the Saudi-led coalition captured Aden and 
has advanced towards the capital Sanaa, 
the strength of the Houthis and their allies 
in the north presages a protracted civil war. 
One outcome of the conflict is already clear: 
the government has completely suspended 
its fight against the local al-Qaeda and the 
US military has had to withdraw its per-
sonnel. This has considerably strengthened 
al-Qaeda, as indicated by two developments 
in particular: in April 2015 it took control 
of the important port of Mukalla, and since 
the summer has been visibly present in 
Aden. By autumn 2015 al-Qaeda in Yemen 
controlled a significantly larger area with 
a much larger population than in 2011/12, 
when it was previously able to exploit the 
weakness of the Yemeni state in a similar 
manner. 
The Organisation 
The Yemeni al-Qaeda was founded in Janu-
ary 2009 as “al-Qaeda in the Arabian Pen-
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insula”. It profited from the particularly 
strong representation of Yemenis in Osama 
Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network, stretching 
back to the 1990s. In fact, though, it is not 
a purely Yemeni organisation, but more an 
alliance of Yemenis and Saudis, since joined 
by smaller groups of foreign fighters. 
In 2005 the Saudi security authorities 
succeeded in ending a campaign of terror 
that had begun in May 2003, and completely 
eliminating the al-Qaeda group there. From 
2006 Saudis seeking to join a jihadist organi-
sation were forced to look abroad. Until the 
emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) in 2013 they almost always 
opted for Yemen and the al-Qaeda group 
there. About one third of its fighters are 
Saudis, who are also strongly represented 
in its leadership. Although the long-serving 
leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi is Yemeni, his 
deputy was the Saudi Ali al-Shihri. After 
Shihri was killed in 2013, military com-
mander Qasim al-Raymi became the new 
number two. Although he is a Yemeni citi-
zen, some sources report he was born in 
Saudi Arabia. After Wuhayshi was killed in 
June 2015 Raymi took over the leadership. 
The new group profited from the weak-
ness of the Yemeni state and the numerous 
domestic conflicts, which hampered any 
effective fight against the terrorists. The 
most important difference between al-Qaeda 
in Yemen and its precursors in the country 
is the new organisation’s irreconcilable 
hostility towards the Yemeni state, whose 
representatives and institutions first came 
into its sights from 2009. Since then al-
Qaeda has conducted numerous attacks 
on Yemeni security forces. As well as major 
suicide bombings it has also carried out 
hundreds of assassinations on individual 
members of the army and security forces, 
accelerating since 2012, with the aim of 
demoralising its adversaries. 
Goals and Strategy 
The Yemeni organisation has developed a 
set of objectives of its own. First of all, it 
wishes to destabilise Yemen, bring territory 
under its control, and establish an Islamic 
state. Secondly, it seeks to topple the ruling 
family in Saudi Arabia. Thirdly, like its par-
ent organisation in Pakistan and Afghani-
stan, it aims to force the United States out 
of the Islamic world. In pursuit of these 
objectives, al-Qaeda conducts attacks on 
Yemeni, Saudi and American (as well as 
British and French) individuals and insti-
tutions. 
Capturing Territory 
Alongside its traditional terrorist activities, 
al-Qaeda in Yemen has worked since 2011 
to capture and hold territory, and establish 
state structures there. This new strategy 
became possible after protests in spring 
2011 weakened the regime of President 
Saleh and caused the government to with-
draw forces from remoter parts of the coun-
try. From its stronghold of Azzan in the 
province of Shabwa, al-Qaeda went on the 
offensive between March and May 2011 and 
captured a string of towns in the neigh-
bouring province of Abyan, including the 
provincial capital of Zanjibar. It declared 
the area it controlled an “Islamic emirate” 
and strove to establish a functioning ad-
ministration there. 
At the same time it founded a civilian 
arm, named Ansar al-Sharia (supporters of 
sharia). This echoed a suggestion made by 
Osama Bin Laden in 2010 in a letter written 
from Abbottabad, calling on his followers 
to find a new name for al-Qaeda that better 
reflected the organisation’s religious and 
political goals. This was part of a broader 
strategy designed to win the populations 
of Muslim countries for al-Qaeda and its 
agenda. In the towns of Jaar, Shaqwa and 
Zanjibar the Yemeni branch consequently 
tried to operate not only as a militant orga-
nisation but also to secure the population’s 
supplies of water, electricity and food. It also 
promised a functioning justice system and 
set up sharia courts to that end. But this 
approach only partly succeeded, because 
Ansar al-Sharia also enforced Salafist codes 
of dress and behaviour and had local oppo-
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nents executed. When the new Yemeni gov-
ernment launched a counter-offensive in 
May 2012 al-Qaeda was quickly forced to 
retreat to the southern mountains. 
When civil war broke out in spring 2015, 
al-Qaeda again grasped the opportunity, 
initially joining Sunni tribal militias from 
the south against advancing Houthi rebels. 
After the Saudi-led coalition began air strikes 
in March, al-Qaeda again captured large 
parts of the provinces of Abyan, Shabwa 
and Hadramaut. At the beginning of April, 
together with allied tribes, it captured 
Mukalla, the country’s fifth-largest city and 
capital of the south-eastern province of 
Hadramaut, where it took over the adminis-
tration together with its allies. In August 
reports also appeared of the presence of 
al-Qaeda units in Aden, shortly after it was 
taken by the Saudi-led coalition. With the 
number of Saudi, Emirate and Yemeni 
troops too small to fight both the rebels 
and al-Qaeda, the latter was able to operate 
largely unhindered. 
Stoking Religious Tensions 
In the course of the advance of the Houthis 
and their allies, al-Qaeda modified its strat-
egy, now seeking to profit from growing 
religious tensions in Yemen through attacks 
on the Shiite Houthi rebels. In this way it 
hoped to win the support of the numerous 
opponents of the Houthis among the coun-
try’s Sunnis. 
The Houthi rebels belong to the Zaydi 
minority whose leaders – “imams” – ruled 
Yemen until 1962. Although the Zaydis are 
Shiites, they are much closer to Sunni Islam 
than the other currents of Shiism. Zaydis 
represent considerably less than half of 
Yemen’s overall population, but are heavily 
concentrated in the capital Sanaa and above 
all in the north of the country. The provin-
cial capital Saada became their most im-
portant centre, and is the stronghold of the 
Houthi rebels. Initially, in the early 2000s, 
the Houthis demanded cultural and reli-
gious rights, which they felt were threat-
ened by the central government’s encour-
agement of Salafist missionising among 
the Zaydis in the north. The government, 
they asserted, was seeking to block potential 
political competition from leading Zaydi 
families. The result was civil war, which has 
erupted on seven separate occasions since 
2004. In the most recent round the Houthis 
joined with forces loyal to former President 
Saleh, who has never accepted his ouster in 
2012. After first capturing Sanaa in Septem-
ber 2014, they toppled the Hadi government 
and marched south, provoking the inter-
vention by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates. 
Since 2004 the Saleh regime branded the 
Houthi rebels as Islamist terrorists and, on 
the basis of their “Shiite” identity, as agents 
of Iran. Riyadh shared this assessment of 
the Houthis as Tehran’s fifth column and 
consequently backed the Yemeni govern-
ment in its fight in the north. In the Arab 
world, where tensions between Sunnis and 
Shiites have heightened enormously since 
2003, the view that the Houthis were fight-
ing on behalf of Iran has become increasing-
ly accepted. 
Al-Qaeda in Yemen always regarded the 
Zaydis as heretics on a par with the Shiites 
as a whole, presenting them as the Yemeni 
arm of an alliance consisting of the United 
States, Iran and their respective allies 
fighting against (true) Islam. Nevertheless 
al-Qaeda concentrated on its war against 
the Yemeni state. One reason for this was 
that al-Qaeda’s strongholds were in the 
south of the country, whereas until 2015 
the Houthis operated exclusively in the 
north. Another is that this strategy corre-
sponded to the priorities set by Bin Laden 
and his successor Ayman al-Zawahiri, who 
had long insisted that al-Qaeda should 
restrict itself to the struggle against the 
United States and its allies. Al-Qaeda in 
Yemen only abandoned that narrow line 
after the Houthis captured Sanaa and 
marched south towards Aden. Since then 
the intensity of attacks on Houthi soldiers 
and officials has increased in all parts of 
the country, including Sanaa and occasion-
ally even Saada. In its propaganda al-Qaeda 
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emphasises that it is resisting the Iranians 
and Houthis jointly with the Sunni tribes 
of Yemen. In this way it has forged tribal 
alliances enabling successes like the cap-
ture of Mukalla. 
The al-Qaeda Vanguard 
By 2010 Washington already regarded the 
Yemeni al-Qaeda as the greatest terrorist 
danger to the West. Among the “al-Qaeda 
branches” or “affiliates” of the parent orga-
nisation in Pakistan, the Yemeni group was 
(after its Saudi counterpart was smashed in 
2006) the one with the closest relationship 
to the al-Qaeda headquarters, thanks above 
all to personal contacts. Yemenis and Saudis 
were strongly represented there into the 
2000s and served as fiercely loyal followers 
of Bin Laden. This applies especially to the 
first leader of al-Qaeda in Yemen, Nasir 
al-Wuhayshi, who stood in correspondence 
with Bin Laden until his death and accepted 
his ideological, strategic and tactical in-
structions. Wuhayshi was also so close to 
Zawahiri that the latter appointed him 
number two in the global al-Qaeda network 
– and thus his own successor – in July/ 
August 2013. 
Under Wuhayshi’s leadership the Yemeni 
branch quickly became the avant-garde 
of al-Qaeda terrorism, and was the first 
regional organisation to attempt to conduct 
attacks inside the United States. Al-Qaeda 
in Yemen also became an important pio-
neer of jihadist propaganda. 
Attacks on the United States, 
Saudi Arabia and Europe 
Zawahiri’s promotion of Wuhayshi repre-
sented little more than an acceptance 
of the new reality after the al-Qaeda head-
quarters in Pakistan had been greatly 
weakened by the loss of Bin Laden and the 
killing of numerous leading cadres by US 
drones. Al-Qaeda in Yemen, on the other 
hand, had already planned and prepared 
two attacks on the United States that both 
only narrowly failed. The first was on Christ-
mas Day 2009, when vigilant passengers 
prevented Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab 
from detonating explosives hidden in his 
underpants as their plane was coming in 
to land at Detroit. The young Nigerian had 
received training in Yemen. A second at-
tempt failed in October 2010, when the 
organisation smuggled printer cartridges 
packed with explosives onto two cargo jets 
bound for the United States. 
Although both attacks were ultimately 
prevented, they were the closest al-Qaeda 
had come to striking inside the United 
States since 2001. By 2010 therefore the 
US security authorities regarded the Yem-
eni organisation as a greater danger than 
al-Qaeda Central in Pakistan, largely on 
the basis of the skills of its legendary bomb-
maker Ibrahim al-Asiri. He originates from 
Saudi Arabia, where he broke off his chem-
istry studies before fleeing to Yemen in 2006. 
With al-Qaeda he quickly acquired the 
reputation of a creative explosives expert, 
building the bombs that initially remained 
undetected on Mutallab’s body in 2009 and 
in the printer cartridges in 2010. 
In another case one of Asiri’s bombs 
did actually explode. In August 2009 Asiri’s 
brother managed to arrange a meeting 
with the then Saudi deputy interior minis-
ter Prince Muhammad bin Naif Al Saud in 
Jeddah, on the pretext of wishing to give 
himself up. While the explosives concealed 
on his body only killed their bearer, the 
attack demonstrated in no uncertain terms 
that the Yemeni al-Qaeda could also strike 
in Saudi Arabia. Muhammad bin Naif, who 
is today crown prince and interior minister, 
was targeted because since 2003 he had 
turned the Saudi security forces into an 
effective instrument against al-Qaeda, and 
increasingly deployed them in Yemen too. 
To this day he remains the Saudi politician 
most hated by al-Qaeda. 
Although these attacks against the United 
States and Saudi Arabia were prevented or 
failed, the danger of similar operations re-
mains. For Asiri still lives in southern Yemen 
and is reported to have trained other al-Qaeda 
members in bomb-making. 
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Propaganda 
At roughly the same time as the attempted 
attacks described above, al-Qaeda in Yemen 
also placed itself at the forefront of jihadist 
propaganda, using the English-language 
online magazine Inspire whose first issue 
appeared in July 2010. 
In the interim fourteen issues have been 
published, with the early editions demon-
strating particular long-term impact. The 
goal of the publication was always to mobi-
lise supporters and sympathisers in the 
West. In it the Yemeni al-Qaeda repeatedly 
called on its supporters to conduct attacks 
in their home countries using simple means, 
rather than undertaking the dangerous jour-
ney to training camps in South Asia, the 
Arab world or Africa. In the following years 
there were indeed increasing indications 
that numerous activists in North America 
and Europe had been “inspired” by these in-
structions. This was especially consequential 
in the case of the Boston Marathon Bombers 
in 2013, who sourced their bomb-making 
instructions from the magazine (“Make a 
bomb in the kitchen of your Mom”). 
Another reason why Inspire was so in-
fluential was the presence of the Yemeni 
al-Qaeda’s religious mentor, the Yemeni-
American Anwar al-Awlaki, in the team of 
authors. Awlaki left the United States in 
2002 and joined al-Qaeda a few years later. 
He was the first jihadist religious authority 
who was able to address supporters and 
sympathisers in the diaspora in perfect 
English, and became a decisive influence 
on many of them. This was especially vis-
ible in the case of the Palestinian-American 
US Army major Nidal Malik Hasan, who 
shot dead thirteen of his comrades at Fort 
Hood in November 2009 and injured forty-
two others. Before the shooting spree he 
had been in lively e-mail contact with 
Awlaki. Even after Awlaki was killed in an 
American drone strike in September 2011, 
his influence on jihadists in the West lives 
on. To this day his publications are found 
in their possession, and even years after his 
death he remains the most important Eng-
lish-speaking jihadist preacher. 
Danger to Europe and the 
United States 
Despite all these efforts, it was 2015 before 
al-Qaeda in Yemen conducted a successful 
operation in the West: the attack on the 
offices of the French satirical magazine 
Charlie Hebdo in Paris on 7 January, in which 
twelve people died (the attack on the Jewish 
supermarket was a separate action). 
The attackers Said and Chérif Kouachi 
were French of Algerian extraction, and 
at least one of them had trained in Yemen 
around 2011. After the brothers fled to 
the outskirts of Paris following the attack, 
Chérif Kouachi gave a telephone interview 
with a journalist in which he claimed to 
have acted on behalf of al-Qaeda in Yemen, 
and to have been trained and funded by 
Anwar al-Awlaki. Al-Qaeda in Yemen itself 
subsequently claimed responsibility for the 
attack. This information not only fits with 
the brothers’ known movements, but also 
with the al-Qaeda headquarters’ designation 
of Charlie Hebdo as a prime target in Europe. 
In issue ten of Inspire in 2013, al-Qaeda in 
Yemen explicitly called on its supporters 
in Europe to attack the satirical magazine’s 
editor-in-chief, Stéphane Charbonnier. 
The act of terror in Paris was the first 
successful al-Qaeda operation in a Western 
state since the London bombing of July 2005. 
Notably, the al-Qaeda-leadership in Pakistan 
appears to have played no role at all in the 
planning. The event demonstrated yet again 
the organisation’s great strategic patience 
in its efforts to strike the United States and 
its allies. The target was carefully chosen 
for its potential to shock French politics 
and society. The terrorists’ objective was to 
provoke France into overreacting not only 
against jihadists but more generally against 
Muslims at home and abroad, in order to 
prove their own assertion that the West was 
waging war on Islam. 
Al-Qaeda in Yemen will continue to 
attempt to conduct attacks in the West. It 
should be a warning to Europe that the 
preparations for the Paris attack were made 
back in 2011, when al-Qaeda first controlled 
territory in Yemen. In winter 2015/16 the 
SWP Comments 4 
January 2016 
6 
situation in Yemen is even worse, with 
al-Qaeda controlling not only a larger area 
but also the major city of Mukalla, and a 
presence in Aden. The organisation can still 
draw on the know-how of its bomb-maker 
Asiri, and in recent years has lacked only 
recruits from Western states. 
That is why the news about the so-called 
Khorasan group in Syria is especially con-
cerning. While “Khorasan” historically 
designates a region now occupied by parts 
of north-eastern Iran, Turkmenistan, Uz-
bekistan and Afghanistan, among Arab 
jihadists today the name is a synonym for 
Afghanistan. The Khorasan group is not an 
autonomous organisation, but is made up 
of members of al-Qaeda, including leading 
figures, who travelled in 2013 and 2014 
from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran to 
Syria, where they joined the local al-Qaeda 
organisation, the Nusra Front. 
The group worked to win recruits from 
Western countries, who had travelled 
to Syria in their thousands since mid-/late 
2012, for attacks on airliners flying between 
Europe and the United States. To that end 
Khorasan is also reported to have pursued 
contact with the Yemeni al-Qaeda for bomb-
making expertise. American terrorism warn-
ings in July 2014 underlined the concrete 
nature of these plans, requiring air passen-
gers travelling to the United States to de-
monstrate that the batteries of their elec-
tronic devices were charged (and therefore 
contained no explosives). Washington spoke 
of involvement of Yemeni bomb-makers, 
and some observers even asserted that 
Asiri had played a decisive role in the plan-
ning. 
US airstrikes in September and Novem-
ber 2014 killed numerous members of the 
Khorasan group. In July 2015 Washington 
confirmed that its Kuwaiti leader Muhsin 
al-Fadhli had been killed in a drone attack, 
while the same fate befell French Khorasan 
bomb-maker David Drugeon. It is too early 
to tell whether the group will be able to 
continue to pursue its plans despite these 
losses. But it is clear that there is a large 
recruitment pool of Americans and Euro-
peans in Syria. In the coming years they 
present a great danger to the West. 
IS in Yemen 
Despite its gains through the civil war, 
al-Qaeda has come under pressure on two 
fronts in 2014 and 2015. Firstly, an IS off-
shoot has emerged in Yemen, exposing 
al-Qaeda to competition at home. Secondly, 
a string of leading members have been 
killed in US drone strikes. 
In November 2014 a group of previously 
unknown Yemeni jihadists swore allegiance 
to IS leader and self-appointed caliph Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi. They appear to have been 
largely former al-Qaeda members. The real 
existence of local structures having joined 
the Iraqi/Syrian organisation was demon-
strated in March 2015, when an IS group 
conducted suicide attacks on two Zaydi 
mosques in Sanaa, in which almost one hun-
dred fifty people died. This represented a 
new development, as al-Qaeda had hitherto 
always sought to spare civilians. IS, on the 
other hand, explicitly seeks to stoke confes-
sional tensions through spectacular attacks 
on Shiites and other religious minorities, in 
order to seize power in the ensuing chaos. 
Numerous similar acts of terror followed 
in the subsequent months. The bombing of 
a Zaydi mosque in Sanaa on 22 May 2015 
was especially striking, because a similar 
attack occurred simultaneously on a Shiite 
mosque in Qatif in eastern Saudi Arabia. 
Given that IS claimed responsibility for both, 
it can be assumed that the operations were 
coordinated. This would suggest that the 
Yemeni IS, like the local al-Qaeda, has its 
sights on neighbouring Saudi Arabia as 
well as Yemen, and that the IS groups in the 
two countries work together or are perhaps 
even a single organisation. Evidence for this 
theory is also found in propaganda videos 
showing that many fighters in the Yemeni 
IS are Saudis. The same also applies to the 
group’s leader to date, Abu Bilal al-Harbi, 
who is reported to accept the oaths of alle-
giance of new IS members in Yemen on 
behalf of the “caliph” Abu Bakr. 
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It is especially striking that IS has been 
able to conduct attacks in Saudi Arabia, 
where al-Qaeda had failed in the preceding 
years. The operation in Qatif in May was pre-
ceded by a string of less spectacular attacks 
– successful and unsuccessful – in which an 
IS connection had only been suspected. Just 
a week after Qatif, an IS suicide bombing of 
a Shiite mosque in Dammam was averted, 
although the premature detonation still 
killed four. Finally, in August 2015 a suicide 
attacker killed fifteen in a Sunni mosque in 
Abha in south-western Saudi Arabia used 
largely by members of the security services. 
IS appears to be capable of recruiting new 
fighters in Saudi Arabia and conducting 
repeated attacks at longer intervals, sug-
gesting that the organisation has estab-
lished structures on the ground. 
Al-Qaeda did all it could to resist IS in 
Yemen, including sharply criticising the 
attacks on civilians and mosques. But it 
was unable to avoid losing recruits and 
even commanders. The best-known was 
Jalal Bal’idi (alias Abu Hamza al-Zanjibari), 
a field commander in southern Yemen 
feared for his brutality. In August 2014 the 
group he commanded kidnapped fourteen 
soldiers in the province of Hadramaut, killed 
them and beheaded four – the latter an oc-
currence not hitherto seen in Yemen. The 
al-Qaeda-leadership’s sharp criticism of 
Bal’idi is likely simply to have driven him 
further into the arms of the IS. In January 
2015 the local press reported that he had 
joined IS and opened a training camp in 
Hadramaut. The case of Bal’idi demon-
strates the pressure al-Qaeda faces from IS: 
if it wants to stem the loss of recruits it has 
to at least tolerate more brutal tactics. 
The weakening of al-Qaeda by IS was 
further amplified by its loss of important 
leaders. By 2009 the United States had 
recognised the Yemeni al-Qaeda as a great 
danger and expanded its successful Paki-
stani drone war to Yemen in December that 
year. But apart from the liquidation of 
Anwar al-Awlaki in September 2011 and 
Said al-Shihri in 2013, the United States 
initially failed to make significant inroads 
into the organisation’s leadership. That 
did not change until 2015, in parallel with 
the outbreak of civil war. Several impor-
tant leaders were killed in the course of 
the year, including on 12 June Emir Nasir 
al-Wuhayshi. This represented al-Qaeda’s 
perhaps greatest loss since the death of Bin 
Laden in 2011. Ironically the killing of so 
many leading figures in Yemen in 2015 
benefited above all IS, because men like 
Wuhayshi and the religious leader Ibrahim 
al-Rubaish killed in April enjoyed strong 
reputations. Their mere presence in the 
ranks of al-Qaeda made it easier to recruit 
young fighters and acquire donations. The 
fewer prominent members of al-Qaeda sur-
vived, the more dangerous the competition 
of IS became. 
Al-Qaeda Remains Strong 
Despite competition from IS, there is much 
to suggest that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Pen-
insula is the stronger organisation in Yemen 
and (in coalition with allies like the Nusra 
Front in Syria) will remain a terrorist danger 
to the West. The group is firmly anchored 
among jihadists in Yemen and Saudi Arabia 
and can count on assistance from local 
allies in southern Yemen. Its leadership 
structure also appears to have survived the 
losses of 2015 intact. Even when the civil 
war comes to an end, it will be a great deal 
more difficult than in 2012 to retake the 
territory it controls. Beyond that it is un-
clear when and how the civil war can be 
ended at all, and whether there will be any 
kind of functioning Yemeni state again in 
the coming years. The longer the fighting 
lasts, the greater the danger that al-Qaeda 
will be able to consolidate its grip and use 
its territory as a base for planning attacks 
in Saudi Arabia and the West. 
In its conflict with IS, al-Qaeda also has 
the advantage of the better strategy. For the 
IS groups in Yemen (like in Iraq and Syria) 
are fighting against all others, whereas 
al-Qaeda frequently enters alliances and 
thus improves its own chances of success. 
But this could become more difficult, as 
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the rivalry could force al-Qaeda to act with 
greater brutality than hitherto. This applies 
above all to the fight against the Houthis, 
who are already increasingly coming into 
al-Qaeda’s sights. These acts of violence will 
strengthen the religious dimension of the 
conflict in Yemen, enormously complicate 
future conflict-resolution, and play into the 
hands of IS. Rivalry with IS is also likely to 
increase the pressure on al-Qaeda to conduct 
attacks on Saudi Arabia and/or the West. 
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